EXOR is easy to overlook. It is a family-controlled European holding company with a complicated portfolio, limited influence for minority shareholders and meaningful exposure to businesses that have recently struggled. For many investors, that is enough reason to move on. Yet those same characteristics have created a valuation that is difficult to ignore. At the end of 2025, EXOR reported gross asset value of €37.1 billion, net asset value of €33.2 billion and NAV per share of €164.4. Its market capitalisation stood at approximately €15 billion, meaning the shares traded at a reported 56% discount to NAV. In practical terms, the market was offering one euro of underlying assets for roughly forty-four cents.
Some discount is justified. Holding companies rarely trade at the full value of their assets, especially when a controlling family has far more voting power than ordinary shareholders. But there is a difference between a reasonable structural discount and a valuation that assumes almost every source of uncertainty will end badly. EXOR does not need to trade at full NAV for the investment to work. It does not need every portfolio company to recover at the same time, and it does not require a dramatic corporate event. The case rests on a more modest set of assumptions: Ferrari remains an exceptional business, management continues to allocate capital sensibly, repurchases increase the value owned by each remaining shareholder, and some of the pessimism surrounding the weaker assets eventually fades.
The portfolio composition explains why the discount is so interesting. At 31 December 2025, Ferrari represented 32.4% of gross asset value, followed by Stellantis at 11.5%, Philips at 11.4%, Lingotto at 11.4% and CNH Industrial at 7.8%. Iveco represented another 3.7%, although its disposal had already been agreed. Juventus accounted for 2.1%, Via Transportation for 0.9% and Clarivate for 0.5%. Unlisted companies collectively represented 8.2%, other investments 6.3% and cash 3.8%. These figures measure the weight of each asset inside EXOR’s GAV, rather than the percentage of each company owned by EXOR.
For additional context, EXOR held a 19.5% economic stake in Ferrari, 15.5% of Stellantis, 19.0% of Philips and 26.9% of CNH at the end of 2025. Its voting power was considerably higher in several of these companies, reflecting loyalty-share structures and its role as a long-term reference shareholder. EXOR states that roughly 80% of its portfolio consists of businesses where it acts as a reference shareholder and participates actively at board level. This is not simply a passive collection of listed shares; it is a concentrated capital-allocation vehicle with real influence over its most important investments.
The easiest way to understand the thesis is still to begin with Ferrari. EXOR’s stake was worth approximately €12 billion at the end of 2025, compared with EXOR’s own market capitalisation of about €15 billion. Investors were not literally receiving the remainder of the portfolio for free, because debt, corporate costs and other liabilities must be considered. Nevertheless, the comparison demonstrates how little value the market was assigning to Philips, Stellantis, CNH, Lingotto, the private portfolio and the company’s cash once Ferrari was accounted for.
Ferrari also deserves to be treated differently from a conventional automotive manufacturer. Its economics are driven less by production volume and more by scarcity, personalisation, brand strength and pricing power. In 2025, Ferrari generated €7.15 billion of revenue and €2.11 billion of EBIT, producing an EBIT margin of 29.5%. Revenue increased by 7% and EBIT by 12%, while the company continued to limit volumes rather than chase unit growth. Those figures are closer to the economics of a luxury house than to those of a mass-market carmaker.
EXOR’s non-Ferrari holdings offer recovery potential rather than comparable quality: Philips could improve through better execution and margin normalization after the Respironics crisis, Stellantis only needs a credible operational and cash-flow recovery to reduce its drag, and CNH could benefit from a cyclical rebound in agricultural equipment demand. Lingotto stands out as the most promising growth asset, having reached about €4.2 billion in value and over $10 billion in assets under management, giving EXOR a scalable investment platform that can compound capital and reduce its dependence on automotive and industrial businesses
The real test for any holding company is not simply what it owns, but how management allocates capital. EXOR’s history is not flawless, but its long-term record is stronger than the recent share-price performance might suggest. Since its 2009 listing, NAV per share has compounded at 16.3% annually, compared with 11.6% for the MSCI World Index in euros. The company clearly underperformed during 2024 and 2025, but the longer record demonstrates that EXOR has created substantial value across several market cycles.
Recent allocation decisions also support the thesis. EXOR raised substantial capital through the sale of PartnerRe, reduced its Ferrari concentration, increased its commitment to healthcare, developed Lingotto and moved to simplify the portfolio. It signed agreements to dispose of Iveco, GEDI, Lifenet and NUO, transactions expected to generate approximately €2 billion during 2026 at more than 1.4 times invested capital. Management said these disposals would raise the cash available for deployment to more than €3.5 billion, leaving EXOR capable of pursuing an investment comparable in scale to Philips.
Share repurchases are even more important. EXOR launched a €1 billion tender offer in March 2025 after completing another €1 billion programme initiated in 2023. During 2025, shares outstanding declined by 5.4%. Buying back stock while it trades at a deep discount to NAV is mechanically accretive: every share cancelled increases the portion of Ferrari, Philips, Lingotto and the other assets attributable to each remaining share. Management does not need to identify a brilliant external acquisition to create value. It can purchase its own portfolio below its estimated worth.
This changes the way the discount should be interpreted. A wide discount is frustrating when management ignores it. It becomes more useful when management actively repurchases shares. If the market continues to value EXOR cheaply, the company can retire more shares below NAV. If the discount eventually narrows, shareholders benefit from the re-rating. The investor is not entirely dependent on the market suddenly changing its mind because the company can create value internally while waiting.
EXOR’s conservative balance sheet makes that patience possible. Its loan-to-value ratio was only 6.9% at the end of 2025, well below its stated target of 15%, while debt maturities had been extended and liquidity had improved. A heavily leveraged holding company may be forced to sell assets during a downturn. EXOR is in the opposite position: it can wait, repurchase shares, dispose of assets selectively and deploy capital when a suitable opportunity appears.
There is unlikely to be one dramatic catalyst. Value is more likely to emerge through a series of smaller developments: continued buybacks, completion of planned disposals, a less severe operating environment at Philips or CNH, a credible reset at Stellantis, further growth at Lingotto and disciplined use of the available cash. Ferrari can continue compounding at the centre of the portfolio while the weaker assets simply become less problematic. The thesis benefits from having several possible routes to a satisfactory outcome rather than depending on one takeover, spin-off or court decision.
The bear case still deserves attention. The discount could remain wide for years, particularly because the Agnelli family retains overwhelming control. At the end of 2025, Giovanni Agnelli B.V. held 54.94% of EXOR’s economic rights but 83.97% of its voting rights. Minority shareholders must therefore accept that strategic decisions will remain firmly in the hands of the controlling family. That structure deserves a permanent discount, even if the current discount appears excessive.
Governance and legal uncertainty cannot be dismissed either. In April 2026, Reuters reported that Turin prosecutors had requested that John Elkann stand trial in a tax-fraud case connected to the inheritance of his grandmother. Elkann’s lawyers rejected the allegations, while the administrative side of the case had previously been settled. These proceedings do not directly alter the operating value of Ferrari or Philips, but they can weigh on sentiment toward the controlling structure and help keep the holding-company discount elevated.
Those risks explain why EXOR is cheap. They do not necessarily explain why it should trade at less than half of NAV. The investment case is not that the market has invented its concerns. It is that it may be pricing them too aggressively and treating several separate problems as though they will all lead to permanent value destruction.
The asymmetry remains compelling. Investors gain exposure to Ferrari, a high-quality and highly profitable global brand, through a conservatively financed holding company trading at a severe discount. They also receive Lingotto’s growth potential, healthcare exposure through Philips, cyclical recovery optionality in CNH and Stellantis, and an internal value-creation mechanism through share repurchases.
The thesis does not require everything to go right. It requires Ferrari to remain strong, management to avoid destroying value and the rest of the portfolio to perform somewhat better than today’s low expectations imply. Full discount closure is unnecessary. If NAV per share grows and the discount merely becomes less extreme, the return can still be attractive. However, discount is expected to return to its historical mean (around 40%) from 56,5% in current prices. Applying the valuation model available on https://www.trimmtrack.com/explore this would imply a price target of 88,37% with a expected gain of 34,87%.
Ferrari provides the quality, the balance sheet provides resilience, buybacks turn the discount into an advantage and the wider portfolio supplies optionality. The risks justify caution and sensible position sizing, but at the current valuation they do not appear strong enough to eliminate the opportunity.
Investment view: Buy, with a staged entry and a three-to-five-year horizon.
Portfolio weights and financial figures refer primarily to 31 December 2025. Because the listed holdings move daily and several disposals are expected to complete during 2026, the NAV and portfolio composition should be updated before publication or investment. This article represents an investment thesis, not financial advice.
Sources
EXOR, Annual Report 2025 and FY2025 financial results.
EXOR, Net Asset Value, ownership structure and share-buyback disclosures.
Ferrari, FY2025 financial results.
Stellantis and CNH, FY2025 financial results.
Reuters, reporting on the legal proceedings involving John Elkann.